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The Defendant, BARBARA JOYCE HOWELL, respectfully submits this 
brief in opposition to the Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the question presented by the Petitioner is of 
the character and scope necessary to be considered by the Utah 
Supreme Court on certiorari or whether the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is case and fact specific, thus not entitling Petitioner to 
a Writ of Certiorari under the provisions of Rule 46 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
2. Whether the decision by the Utah Court of Appeals in this 
matter has created a new rule in awarding alimony or whether it is 
instead consistent with prior case law. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1) (1989): 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, and 
parties. 
Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter 
of right, but of judicial discretion, and will 
be granted only for special and important 
reasons. The following, while neither 
controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme 
Courtfs discretion, indicate the character of 
reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision in conflict with a 
decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has decided a question of state or federal law 
in a way that is in conflict with a decision 
of the Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision that has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned 
such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power 
of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided 
an important question of municipal, state, or 
federal law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant does not dispute the initial paragraph of the 
Plaintiff's statement of the case. However, the Defendant would 
clarify and supplement the remaining facts outlined in the 
Plaintiff's statement of the case. To begin with, the substantial 
discrepancy between the Plaintiff's income at the time of the 
filing of the Complaint and the time of trial, two years later, was 
due in large part to a mutual decision of the parties during their 
marriage. Specifically, the Plaintiff's employer. Western 
Airlines, suffered severe financial problems in 1984. At that 
time, Western Airlines asked its pilots to accept a wage freeze 
(TR. 113). The parties agreed to do so, and as a result, the 
family experienced a financial strain during that period of time 
(TR. 217). In 1986, Delta took over operation of the airlines, and 
Mr. Howell began receiving increased compensation (TR. 114). The 
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Court of Appeals recognized this sacrifice and stated that 
"Plaintiff's ability to take advantage of that change [to Delta] 
was at least in part a result of having persevered during the lean 
times, as did his wife and children." Howell v. Howell, 155 Utah 
Adv. Rptr. 15, 19 (February 28, 1991). 
In addition, although the Complaint was filed in 1986 and the 
trial was conducted in 1988, the parties attempted at least one 
reconciliation during that period of time (TR. 42). Contrary to 
the Plaintiff's statement that the trial court determined the 
standard of living of the parties by examining the five (5) years 
prior to the divorce, the trial court averaged the Plaintiff's 
income earned over the five (5) years prior to the filing of the 
Complaint in 1986 (Findings of Fact, Nos. 5, 6 and 7). 
Based upon this finding as to the standard of living, the 
trial court awarded Mrs. Howell permanent alimony in the amount of 
$1,800.00 per month (Decree of Divorce U 6). Mrs. Howell appealed, 
among other issues, this alimony award, arguing that it was an 
abuse of discretion in light of the disparity between the parties1 
incomes, the length of the marriage, and the Defendant's needs and 
lack of specific job training or skills. Mrs. Howell also argued 
that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine 
the award of alimony using the current income of the Plaintiff at 
the time of trial to establish his ability to pay alimony, while at 
the same time basing the parties' standard of living on the reduced 
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income earned by the Plaintiff during the years 1981 through 1986. 
(See Mrs. Howell's Appellate Brief at Page 1.) The Court of 
Appeals agreed with the Appellant that the trial court had abused 
its discretion and remanded the case for a further determination 
regarding the alimony award. (See Howell, 155 Adv. Rptr. at 21.) 
The crux of the Plaintiff's Petition is that the Court of 
Appeals failed to apply the appropriate standards for alimony and 
that the decision will require the lower courts to project a 
standard of living which may never have existed during the 
marriage. However, Plaintiff's interpretation of the decision is 
not supported by the language therein. 
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court 
had abused its discretion in this case by looking at the pre-
separation standard of living in setting alimony rather than the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, including up to the 
time of trial. The Court of Appeals stated: 
In so concluding we do not intend to establish 
a rigid rule which must be followed in all 
domestic cases, but acknowledge that trial 
courts have discretion to determine the 
standard of living which existed during the 
marriage after consideration of all relevant 
facts and equitable principles. 
M . at 20. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals carefully reviewed the trial 
court's findings with respect to the three factors required to 
determine alimony. Because the trial court failed to make the 
i 
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requisite findings, the Court of Appeals remanded "for findings as 
to Defendant's financial needs, the parties' standard of living at 
the time of the trial, and for adjustment of the amount of alimony 
to better equalize the parties1 abilities to go forward with their 
respective lives." Ri. at 21. 
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed his Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH A COMPELLING 
REASON FOR REVIEW BY THIS COURT. 
The criteria governing the review by this Court of a matter 
decided by the Court of Appeals is outlined in Rule 46 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. While the reasons enumerated therein 
are not the only basis for review, they indicate the character of 
reasons to be considered. These reasons include: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a 
decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law in 
a way that is in conflict with a decision of 
the Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed 
from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a 
departure by a lower court as to call for an 
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of 
supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
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important question of municipal, state, or 
federal law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by the Supreme Court. 
In his brief, Plaintiff has failed to expressly state the 
basis for review as required by Rule 46. The implied basis is that 
the Howell decision is in conflict with other decisions of the 
Court of Appeals and of this Court. However, that is simply not 
the case. 
It is well settled in Utah that a trial court must consider 
three factors in determining alimony. First, it must consider the 
needs of the recipient spouse; second, the ability of that spouse 
to provide for his or her own needs; and third, the ability of the 
payor spouse to pay alimony. (See Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 1072 
(Utah 1985); Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1983); and Naranjo 
v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988).) 
In addition, Utah case law requires consideration of the 
standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage in 
making a determination of alimony. For example, in the case of 
Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988), the Court of 
Appeals stated: 
[Alimony] should, so far as possible, equalize 
the parties1 'respective standards of living 
and maintain them at a level as close as 
possible to the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage1.(citations omitted) 
•[T]he ultimate test of the proprietary of an 
alimony award is whether, given all of these 
factors, the party receiving alimony will be 
able to support him - or herself as nearly as 
possible to the standard of living 
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enjoyed during the marriage.f 
Id. at 1147 (citations omitted). 
Five years prior to the Naranjo decision, this Court 
indirectly addressed the standard of living issue. In Savage v. 
Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983), this Court stated: 
Where a marriage is of long duration and the 
earning capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds 
that of the other, as here, it is appropriate 
to order alimony and child support at a level 
which will insure that the supported spouse 
and children may maintain a standard of living 
not unduly disproportionate to that which they 
would have enjoyed had the marriage continued. 
Id. at 1205 (emphasis added). 
More recently, this Court has addressed the issue in the case 
of Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) . In Gardner, this 
Court stated that "an alimony award should, after a marriage such 
as this and to the extent possible, egualize the parties' 
respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as 
close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage." Rl. at 1081 (emphasis added). 
While the basis for the Plaintiff's Petition is his argument 
that the Howell decision is inconsistent with prior case law, 
including Gardner, that is simply not the case. Instead, the Court 
of Appeals properly articulated the three factors which must be 
considered by trial courts in making an alimony award, and then 
scrutinized the trial court's findings in light of those factors. 
The Court of Appeals found that while the trial court made findings 
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as to the parties' gross incomes, it did not make the requisite 
finding as to Mrs. Howell's financial needs. (See Howell, 155 Utah 
Adv. Rptr. at 2 0.) 
The Court also reiterated the need for trial courts to analyze 
these three factors in light of all the circumstances of the 
parties including their standard of living. The Court of Appeals 
stated: 
Therefore, trial courts should first, 
determine the financial needs and resources 
for both parties, by examining the three 
factors enumerated. Second, the Court should 
set alimony as permitted by those parameters, 
to approximate the parties' standard of living 
during the marriage as closely as possible. 
It follows that if the payor spouse's 
resources are adequate, alimony need not be 
limited to provide for only basic needs, but 
should also consider the recipient 'spouse's 
station in life'. Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 
144, 147 (Utah 1978). 
In Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 
1988), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed an 
alimony award after a long-term marriage. The 
court found that the alimony award in that 
situation should, 'to the extent possible, 
equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living and maintain them at a level as close 
as possible to that standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage.' 16.. at 1081. 
Howell, 155 Utah Adv. Rptr. at 20 (other citations omitted). 
Applying this standard to the facts of the Howell case, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that it was an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court to set the parties' standard of living at the pre-
separation level of income. This resulted in grossly 
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disproportionate post-divorce standards of living, allowing Mr. 
Howell "a two to four times advantage" over Mrs. Howell. (Howell, 
155 Utah Adv. Rptr. at 21.) In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
of Appeals expressly pointed out that: 
[E]xact mathematical equality of income is not 
required, but sufficient parity to allow both 
parties to be on equal footing financially as 
of the time of the divorce is required. 
Id. at 21, fn. 3. 
The Court of Appeals went on to expressly state that it was 
not creating a rigid rule to be followed in all cases. Instead, it 
affirmed the trial court's broad discretion in determining alimony, 
but found that, .in this case, the trial court had abused its 
discretion in setting the standard of living at the pre-separation 
level. 
The Plaintiff relies on the dissent of Judge Bench as a basis 
for review. The thrust of Judge Bench's dissent is that the 
majority has created a judicially unworkable requirement, because 
a determination of the parties' standard of living at the time of 
divorce is purely speculative. However, because the Howell 
decision is consistent with prior case law, it creates no more 
speculation than is already inherent in the process currently used 
by trial courts. In this case, the trial court failed to 
appropriately analyze the disparate earning ability of the parties, 
thereby making an alimony award which failed to provide any parity 
between the parties' post-divorce standards of living. Because all 
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of these factors can be concretely measured by the trial court at 
the time of trial, the determination is in no way speculative. 
Lastly, to support his position, the Plaintiff relies upon the 
case of Bridenbauqh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990) 
and claims that the Howell decision is contrary to Bridenbauqh. 
However, Bridenbauqh is easily distinguished on its facts. The 
issue before the court in that case was a petition to modify the 
decree to terminate alimony. The Petition was brought twenty-two 
years after entry of the Decree of Divorce. As such, Bridenbauqh 
is wholly inapplicable. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should deny the Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari based upon Plaintiff's inability to establish a 
compelling reason for such review. The Howell decision is 
consistent with prior decisions of both the Court of Appeals and 
the Utah Supreme Court, and is case and fact specific. Plaintiff 
is therefore not entitled to a Writ of Certiorari. 
DATED this S^" day of April, 1991. 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS 
#AUL H. AtffPIS 
HELEN YK CHRISTIAN 
KIM M. LUHN 
Attorneys for 
Defendant/Appellant/Respondent 
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